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NATURALIZATION-STATUTORY CoNSTRUCTION-Appellee, a native of
Canada, filed his petition for naturalization. In his application he stated that
he understood the principles of the government of the United States and was
willing to take the prescribed oath of allegiance to this country. To the question
in the application "If necessary are you willing to take up arms in defense of this
country?" he replied, "No, (non-combatant) Seventh Day Adventist." He
explained this answer before the examiner by saying, "It is a purely religious
matter with me, I have no political or personal reasons. other than that." Th.e
district court admitted him to citizenship but this order was reversed by the
circuit court of appeals relying on the Supreme Court's construction of the
naturalization oath in former cases.1 On petition for writ of certiorari the case
came before ·the Supreme Court. Held, reversed. The Supreme Court erred
in its former construction of the naturalization oath. The Naturalization Act
of 1940, by re-enacting the oath of allegiance in its pre-existing form, did not
thereby adopt the Supreme Court's prior construction of it. Also, the Second
War Powers Act of 1942 granting special naturalization priv!Jeges to those
who served honorably in the armed forces but who were prevented from bearing
arms by their religious scruples was affirmative recognition by Congress "that
one could be attached to the principles of our government and could support and
defend it even though his religious convictions prevented him from bearing
arms." Girouard v. United States, (U.S. 1946) 66 S.Ct. 826.2
The Constitution of the United States confers upon Congress exclusive
power to provide for the naturalization of aliens; to determine what classes of
aliens are to be admitted and the conditions upon which they shall be admitted.8
In 1906 as part of the naturalization procedure Congress provided for an oath
of allegiance to be taken by aliens before being admitted to citizenship.~ Though
the oath was general in its nature and did not expressly require that a petitioning
alien promise to bear arms to defend this country, the Supreme Court interpreted

1 (C.C.A. 1st, 1946) 149 F. (2d) 760, noted, 94 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 250
(1946).
21 The late Chief Justice Stone dissented on the ground that the 1940 act adopted
the construction given to the 1906 oath by the Supreme Court in the cases cited in
note 5, infra, and that the subsequent legislation by Congress on the subject of naturalization did not change this result. (Justices Reed and Frankfurter joined in the dissent.) The dissent of the late Chief Justice should be particularly noted since he also
dissented in the Bland and McIntosh cases for reasons that the Court now adopts in
overruling those cases.
3 Article 1, Sec. 8.
~ 34 Stat. L. 596, §§3 and 4 (1906).
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it to imply such a promise.5 This construction of the oath elicited a great deal
of comment.6 And many abortive efforts were made to change the rule of construction laid down by the Court.7 In 1940 Congress passed a new Naturalization Act extensively changing requirements and procedure for naturalization,
yet significantly keeping in its pre-existing form the oath prescribed in the act of
1906.8 In 1942, in the Second War Powers Act, Congress relaxed certain of
the requirements for naturalization of aliens who served honorably in the armed
forces ( whether combatant or noncombatant) though leaving unchanged the
requirement that th.e applicant show his attachment to the principles of the Constitution and that he take the prescribed oath. 9 In the light of this background
the Court was faced in the principal case with a situation where the petitioner
had not served in the armed forces. The majority opinion ably demonstrates
that the conclusion reached by the Court in the previous cases was not inevitable.10 However, it was not the oath requirement of the act of 1906 but the
question of construction raised by the 1940 re-enactment of the same oath
requirement, which was before the Court in the principal case and this hurdle
was not satisfactorily taken. Whatever truth there may be in the Court's generalization that "It is at best treacherous to find in Congressional silence alone
5 United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 49 S.Ct. 448 (1929); United
States v. McIntosh, 283 U.S. 605, 51 S.Ct. 570 (1931); United States v. Bland, 283
U.S. 636, 51 S.Ct. 569 (19°31). Of the three cases cited only the Bland case was
factually similar to the principal case in that the refusal to bear arms was based on
religious scruples.
6 28 M1cH. L. REv. 445 (1930); 30 MrcH. L. REV. 133 (1931); 40 YALE
L. J. 653 (1931); Gray, "Willingness to Bear Arms as a Prerequisite to Naturalization," 7 N. Y. UN1v. L. Q. 723 (1929); Hazard, "'Attachment to Principles of the
Constitution' as Judicially Construed in Certain Naturalization Cases in the United
States," 23 AM. J. INT. L. 783 (1929).
7 Bills to overturn the ruling of the Supreme Court decisions were introduced
before six successive Congresses following the Schwimmer decision. For a list of these
bills see footnotes 2, 3, 4 on page 832 of the principal case.
8 54 Stat. L. 1137 at 1157, §335(b) (1940), 8 U.S.C. (1940) §735(b), which
provides, "I hereby declare, on oath •• ~ that I will support and defend the Constitution and laws of the United States of America against all enemies, foreign and
domestic ••••"
And 54 Stat. L. 1137 at 1142, §307(a) (1940), 8 U.S.C. (1940) §707(a)
which provides that no person shall be naturalized unless he has been for a stated period
and still is "a person of good moral character, attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States.•.•"
9 56 Stat. L. 176 at 182 (1942), 8 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1946) §§1001-1005.
10 As indication of the improbability of Congressional intent to exact a promise to
bear arms as a condition to admittance to citizenship, the Court stresses the fact that
in substance the same oath is prescribed for those holding public office [5 U.S.C.
( 1940) § I 6] and that petitioner's religious scruples would not disqualify him from
holding such office. (However, Article VI, CI. 3 of the Constitution specifically provides that "no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or
public Trust under the United States.") As further indication of the probable Congressional intent the Court points out the presence of our Constitutional guarantee of
religious freedom and the long established practice of Congress of excusing from
military service those whose religious convictions oppose it.
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the adoption of a controlling rule of law," 11 it seems to have no application
here. The comments loosed by the Court's decisions, the repeated attempts to
re-interpret or define the meaning of the oath by Congressional action, and the
passage of the act of 1940 with a full awareness of the Court's prior construction
logically indicate Congressional adoption of that construction. 12 Nor is the
Court's contention that the Second War Powers Act of 1942 showed affirmatively a Congressional desire to depart from the construction of the act of 1906
very persuasive. Granting that the act of 1942 permits aliens who have served
in the armed forces to become naturalized without a promise to bear arms
though subject to the same prescribed oath, still the fact that the same oath is
designed "to exact something more from one person than from another" does
not necessarily affect the construction of the act of 1940.18 Since Congress does
have the power to determine the conditions upon which aliens are to be admitted
to citizenship there would seem to be no restraint in setting up a preference based
upon military service.14 Nor is there any logical difficulty present in limiting the
effect of language as to that preferred group. It must be granted that the
Court's decision does avoid the unfavorable consequence of the continuous creation of two classes of citizens with unequal privileges and does arrive at a desirable result. The decision is in keeping also with the Court's consistent policy of
protecting civil and religious liberties.15 It was this "predilection" that no doubt
was a dominant factor in deciding that Congress had intended that the oath of
allegiance remain a fluid concept subject to interpretation by the Court.16 The
11

Principal case at 830.
Since there was a real possibility that our country might be drawn into the
war then raging, Congress might have felt that only those who were prepared to
defend our country by force of arms should be admitted to citizenship.
13
ln re Sawyer, (D.C. Del. 1945) 59 F. Supp. 428; In re Kinloch, (D.C.
Wash. 1944) 53 F. Supp. 521, where the Court said, "If conscientious objectors, who
are aliens, performing military duty, and wearing the uniform, are not granted the
privileges of citizenship under this act, then the act would be meaningless .•••" But
see In re Nielsen, (D.C. D.C. 1945) 60 F. Supp. 240 at 242, 243, where the court
says, "Title 8, U.S.C. (1940) §§1000-1005, neither abrogates, limits or in any
other way qualifies the law as laid down in the Schwimmer, Bland, Mcintosh and
Shelley cases. • ••"
14
The fact that §1004, 8 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1946) provides that the provisions
of the amendment should not apply to "any conscientious objector who performed no
military duty whatever or refused to wear the uniform" would seem to be concrete
evidence that Congress intended such a preference.
15
Stockham, "Summary of Civil Liberties Cases in the l 944 Term of Supreme
Court of the United States," 3 NAT. B. J. 18cy(1945); Green, "Liberty Under the
Fourteenth Amendment: 1943-44," 43 MxcH. L. REv. 437 (1944). Dowling, "Constitutional Developments in Five War Years," 32 VA. L. REv. 461 (1946).
16
The basis of the Court's decision is that if the religious beliefs of a petitioner
do not permit him to bear arms this conviction should not bar him from becoming a
citizen. In this light the Court could conceivably find that one opposed to bearing
arms to defend this country for political or ethical reasons was excluded on the ground
that he was not attached to principles of the Constitution of the United States. However, in the Bland case [283 U.S. 636, 51 S.Ct. 569 (1931)], the Court had refused
to make any such distinction in interpreting the prior statute. Moreover, in view of
12
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Court very properly asserts, "we do not think under the circumstances of this
legislative history that we can properly place on the shoulders of Congress the
burden of the Court's own error," 17 yet at the same time the Court should not
assume the burden of interpreting away an approach taken by Congress that is
not in accord with its own philosophy.
G eorge Brody, S.Ed•

the position presently taken by the Court on "civil liberties" generally, it is very
unlikely that the Court will recognize a distinction of this kind. See Schneiderman
v. United States, 320 U.S. uS, 63 S.Ct. 1333 (1943), noted 42 M1cH. L. REv.
184 (1943).
11 Principal case at 830.
.

